Home » Gujarat » You are reading » 7th CPC: Over 8.77 lakh Gujarat Government Employees and Pensioners to get arrears from March and Odisha govt too. 7th CPC: Over 8.77 lakh Gujarat Government Employees and Pensioners to get arrears from March and Odisha govt too. 7th Pay Commission News latest The Gujarat government on Friday, March 2, announced that all government employees and pensioners will receive arrears from the 7th Central Pay Commission this month onward. The payment will be made in three monthly installments – alternate months – said Gujarat Deputy Chief Minister and Finance Minister Nitin Patel in the assembly. This will benefit about 4.65 lakh Gujarat government employees and over 4.12 lakh pensioners, setting the exchequer back by about Rs Rs 3,279 crore. “As the seventh pay commission was implemented with retrospective effect, employees and pensioners are eligible for arrears. The arrears will be paid from March onward and in three installments every alternate months. Employees will get arrears for seven months and pensioners for nine. These benefits will go to 4.65 lakh employees and 4.12 lakh pensioners of the Gujarat government,” the Times of India quoted Patel as saying. On Friday, the Odisha government also said that the recommendations of the 7th Central Pay Commission would be implemented in regards to employees and pensioners of public sector undertakings in the state. Chief Minister Naveen Patnaik asked the department to revise salaries as per the recommendations of the seventh pay commission and this will come into effect from January 1, 2016, reported the Press Trust of India. The state government had implemented the recommendations for government employees on August 29, 2017, but PSU employees were still waiting for the order. The Central government had approved the recommendations of the Seventh Pay Commission in June 2016. The minimum pay was raised to Rs 18,000 a month from Rs 7,000. The employees had demanded a raise in minimum salary to Rs 26,000 and it was also said that the figures could be raised to Rs 21,000 per month. However, nothing was confirmed. Source: IBT http://www.stategovernmentnews.in/7th-cpc-8-77-lakh-gujarat-government-employees-pensioners-get-arrears-march-odisha-govt/ 2018-03-04T08:51:49+00:00 admin Gujarat 7th Central Pay Commission,7th CPC,7th pay commission,7th Pay Commission News latest,Gujarat 7th CPC News,Gujarat government employees,Odisha 7th CPC News,Odisha government employees 7th CPC: Over 8.77 lakh Gujarat Government Employees and Pensioners to get arrears from March and Odisha govt too. 7th Pay Commission News latest The Gujarat government on Friday, March 2, announced that all government employees and pensioners will receive arrears from the 7th Central Pay Commission this month onward. The payment... admin [email protected] Administrator State Government Employees News
Friday, March 2 2018
Home » Karnataka » You are reading » KARNATAKA Government: Implementation of the recommendations of the Sixth State Pay Commission KARNATAKA Government: Implementation of the recommendations of the Sixth State Pay Commission. PROCEEDINGS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA Sub: Implementation of the recommendations of the Sixth State Pay Commission. GOVERNMENT ORDER NO FD 06 SRP 2018 BANGALORE, DATED 1 st MARCH 2018 The Sixth State Pay Commission constituted in G.O.No.FD 22 SRP 2017 dated 01.06.2017 has submitted its Report (First Volume) on 31.01.2018. 2. The Government have considered the report of the Sixth State Pay Commission and are pleased to extend the revised Master Scale and the revised twenty five standard scales of pay recommended by it. The revised Master Scale and the revised pay scales are as indicated below. I. Revised Master Scale: Rs.17000-400-18600-450-20400-500-22400- 550-24600-600-27000-650-29600-750-32600-850-36000-950-39800- 1100-46400-1250-53900-1450-62600-1650-72500-1900-83900-2200- 97100-2500-112100-2800-128900-3100- 150600 II. Revised 25 standard pay scales: 3. The revised scales of pay will be effective from 1st July 2017. The monetary benefits on account of revision of pay scales will, however, be admissible from lit April 2018. The pay in the revised pay scales shall be fixed as follows:- (a) Basic pay in the existing pay scale as on 01.7.2017. (b) Dearness Allowance admissible at index level of 276.9 points i.e. DA as on 01.7.2017. (c) Fitment benefit of 30% of basic pay as on 01.7.2017. (d) After computing the total of (a), (b) and (c), the pay may be fixed in the revised scale at the stage next above the amount so computed. 4.The pay in the revised pay scales in respect of Primary School Teachers, High School Teachers and Pre-University Lecturers who are drawing Rs.450/400/500 special allowance at present, shall be fixed as follows:- (a) Basic pay in the existing pay scale as on 01.7.2017. (b) Dearness Allowance admissible at index level of 276.9 points i.e. DA as on 01.7.2017. (c) Fitment benefit of 30% of basic pay as on 01.7.2017, (d) Special allowance of Rs.450/400/500 being drawn by the Primary School Teachers, High School Teachers and Pre-University Lecturers; (e) After computing the total of (a), (b) (c) and (d), the pay may be fixed in the revised scale at the stage next above the amount so computed. 5.The recommendations of the 6th State Pay Commission to revise the minimum and maximum Pension from the existing Rs.4800/- and Rs.39,900/- to Rs.8500/- and Rs.75,300/- respectively and corresponding Family Pension from Rs.4,800/- and Rs.23,940/- to Rs.8,500/- and Rs.45,180/- respectively are accepted. The revised pension and family pension of Government servants who have retired or died while in service prior to 01.07.2017 shall be fixed as follows:- a) Basic pension/family pension as on 01.07.2017 b) Dearness allowance of 45.25% as on 01.07.2017 c) 30% of basic pension/family pension as on 01.07.2017 The total of (a) + (b) + (c) above will be subject to a minimum of Rs.8,500/- per month for pension and family pension and maximum of Rs.75,300/- per month in respect of pension and Rs.45,180/- per month in respect of family pension. 6. The recommendations of the 6th State Pay Commission pertaining to grant of Dearness Allowance based on revised formula, revision of HRA and CCA in the revised pay scales, continuation of existing system of grant of charge allowance at the rate of 7.5% of basic pay, enhancement of Group Insurance Scheme contributions of employees, enhancement of DCRG limit to Rs.20.00 lakhs and extension of DCRG and family pension benefit to employees covered under New Pension Scheme are accepted and separate orders/rules in this regard will be issued later. 7. Government are also pleased to extend the above benefits to the employees of the aided educational institutions, local bodies and non-teaching staff of the Universities. 8. The increase in Pay and Allowances on account of the revision of scales of pay shall be payable in cash from 1st April 2018. In cases where a Government servant has retired from service or died while in service or ceased to be in service during the period between 1st July 2017 and 31st March 2018, his pay fixed notionally in the revised scale of pay shall be taken into account for the purpose of calculation of pension/family pension. The monetary benefit shall, however, accrue to the retired Government servant or the beneficiary of the deceased Government servant with effect from 1st April 2018. 9. Allocation of revised scales of pay and regulations of pay and pension therein will be governed by detailed rules, orders and instructions to be issued by the Government separately. http://www.stategovernmentnews.in/karnataka-government-implementation-recommendations-sixth-state-pay-commission/ 2018-03-02T15:49:32+00:00 admin Karnataka 6th CPC pay scales,Karnataka,Karnataka Government 6th CPC,Karnataka State government employees,Karnataka state government news,Sixth State Pay Commission KARNATAKA Government: Implementation of the recommendations of the Sixth State Pay Commission. PROCEEDINGS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA Sub: Implementation of the recommendations of the Sixth State Pay Commission. GOVERNMENT ORDER NO FD 06 SRP 2018 BANGALORE, DATED 1 st MARCH 2018 The Sixth State Pay Commission constituted in G.O.No.FD 22 SRP 2017 dated... admin [email protected] Administrator State Government Employees News 6th CPC pay scales , Karnataka , Karnataka Government 6th CPC , Karnataka State government employees , Karnataka state government news , Sixth State Pay Commission Related Posts
Friday, March 2 2018
Home » Kerala » You are reading » KERALA – FINANCE DEPARTMENT – DEARNESS ALLOWANCE – TIME LIMIT FOR CREDITING ARREARS TO PROVIDENT FUND ACCOUNT – EXTENDED – ORDERS ISSUED GOVERNMENT OF KERALA Abstract FINANCE DEPARTMENT – DEARNESS ALLOWANCE – TIME LIMIT FOR CREDITING ARREARS TO PROVIDENT FUND ACCOUNT – EXTENDED – ORDERS ISSUED. FINANCE (PAY RESEARCH UNIT) DEPARTMENT G.O. (P) No. 23/2018/Fin. Dated, Thiruvananthapuram, 20.02.2018. Read:- 1. G.O. (P) No. 120/2007/Fin, dated 20.03.2007 G.O. (P) No. 531/2007,’Fin, dated 05.11.2007 G.O. (P) No. 547/2007/Fin, dated 14.11.2007 G.O. (P) No. 91/2008/Fin, dated 16.02.2008 G.O. (P) No. 220/2008/Fin, dated 22.05.2008 G.O. (P) No. 38/2009/Fin, dated 17.01.2009 G.O. (P) No. 211/2009/Fin, dated 02.06.2009 G.O. (P) No. 512/2009/Fin, dated 18.11.2009 G.O. (P) No. 362/2010/Fin, dated 03.07.2010 G.O. (P) No. 37/2011/Fin, dated 18.01.2011 G.O. (P) No. 180/2011/Fin, dated 11.04.2011 G.O. (P) No. 535/2011/Fin, dated 14.11.2011 G.O. (P) No. 323/2012/Fin, dated 04.06.2012 G.O. (P) No. 614/2012/Fin, dated 08.11.2012 G.O. (P) No. 220/2013/Fin, dated 14.05.2013 G.O. (P) No. 630/2013/Fin, dated 23.12.2013 G.O. (P) No. 221/2014/Fin, dated 16.06.2014 G.O. (P) No. 72/2015/Fin, dated 07.02.2015 G.O. (P) No. 335/2015/Fin, dated 07.08.2015 G.O. (P) No. 525/2015/Fin, dated 18.11.2015 G.O(P) No. 62/2016/Fin, dated 05.05.2016 G.O(P) No. 61/2016/Fin, dated 05.05.2016 G.O. (P) No. 6/2017/Fin, dated 19.01.2017 G.O. (P) No. 26/2017/Fin, dated 22.02.2017 G.O(P) No. 55/2017/Fin dated 26.04.2017 ORDER The time limit for crediting arrears of Dearness Allowance to the Provident Fund Account of the employees specified in the Government Orders read from l to 23rd paper above was extended vide the G.O. read as 24ih above from time to time upto 31.07.2017. The time limit for crediting the arrears of DA to the Provident Fund Account of employees specified in, the Government Order read as 25′ above expired on 31.10.2017. 2. Several requests have been received from various Heads of Departments, institutions and individuals seeking extension of time for crediting the arrears of Dearness Allowance for the period from 01.01.2005 onwards to the Provident Fund Account. 3. Government have examined the matter in detail and are pleased to order that the time limit for crediting the arrears of Dearness Allowance from 01.01.2005 to 01.01.2017 to the Provident Fund Account of i.he employees as per the respective orders read above will be extended up to 30.06.2018. The arrears of Dearness Allowance not claimed so far will be drawn in the salary bill for any month up to 30.06.2018 and credited to Provident Fund Account. 4. All Drawing and Disbursing Officers will adhere to the time schedule without fail. By Order of the Governor LETHI. S
Monday, March 19 2018
Pictures of the Week: St. Patrick's Day, Northern Lights, School Walkout and More A train departs from a station on the outskirts of New Delhi on February 28, 2017. The young couple is said to have kissed before throwing themselves in front of an oncoming train. PRAKASH SINGH/AFP/Getty Images Interfaith relationships are still a controversial topic in India, and religious tolerance between Hindus and Muslims is far from guaranteed. Since the election of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) party in June 2014, communal tensions have been rising . The government, led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, has been accused of stoking anti-Muslim violence since it took office, according to human rights groups. Modi himself was denied a visa to visit the U.S. in 2005 because of his alleged role in the 2002 Gujarat riots , a three-day period of Hindu-Muslim violence that erupted after a train carrying Hindu pilgrims was burned in the Gujarati city of Godhra. The riots left as many as 2,000 people dead, and Modi —chief minister of Gujarat at the time—was accused of not doing enough to stop the violence. BJP workers wave flags as they celebrate outside the party office in Mumbai on May 16, 2014. Narendra Modi's government has been accused of stoking communal tensions since coming into power. PUNIT PARANJPE/AFP/Getty Images A 2017 case grabbed the nation’s attention—and headlines—when a court in the southern Indian state of Kerala annulled the marriage of a Hindu woman who had converted to Islam and married a Muslim man. The annulment was ordered despite the woman’s claim that she converted to Islam of her own free will. Radical Hindu groups described the marriage as “ love jihad ” and accused Muslim men of participating in a “conspiracy to turn Hindu women from their religion by seducing them,” the BBC reported. India’s Supreme Court ruled to restore the marriage this month. There have also been outbreaks of religious violence over the slaughter of cows and sale of beef products. The cow is a sacred animal in the Hindu religion, and “cow protection” groups have been formed across India, though cow slaughter or sale is already banned in most states. Such protection groups killed 28 Indians—of which 24 were Muslims—and injured another 124 between 2010 and 2017, according to Reuters .
Wednesday, March 14 2018
39 Indians Missing In Iraq Since 2014 Are All Dead, Declares Sushma Swaraj Faced With Delhi's Pollution, Modi's Government Bought Air Purifiers Michelle Obama’s Portrait Is So Popular It Had To Be Moved Sudan, The World’s Last Male Northern White Rhino, Dies Aged 45 Why The Rohingya Can't Return 39 Indians Missing In Iraq Since 2014 Are All Dead, Declares Sushma Swaraj Faced With Delhi's Pollution, Modi's Government Bought Air Purifiers Michelle Obama’s Portrait Is So Popular It Had To Be Moved Sudan, The World’s Last Male Northern White Rhino, Dies Aged 45 Business Why The Rohingya Can't Return Entertainment Bollywood Comedy Viral Video Reviews J. K. Rowling Has Magical Message For 'Harry Potter' Fan With Depression Lifestyle NEWS 13 Stephen Hawking Quotes That Perfectly Sum Up His Humour And His Brilliance Speechless, yet extraordinary. By Sara C 14/03/2018 4:22 PM IST | Updated 15/03/2018 3:21 PM IST Physicist Stephen Hawking sought to explain some of the most complicated questions of life while living under the shadow of a premature death. One of the world’s finest scientific minds, Professor Hawking was as renowned for his tireless work in understanding the universe as for his quick wit and humorous slant on life. Here are some of his most famous and relatable quotes... Press Association Rex Features Rex Features Rex Features Rex Features Rex Features Rex Features Reuters Reuters Reuters Rex Features Rex Features Rex Features SUBSCRIBE AND FOLLOW Get top stories and blog posts emailed to me each day. Newsletters may offer personalized content or advertisements. Learn more Newsletter Please enter a valid email address Thank you for signing up! You should receive an email to confirm your subscription shortly. There was a problem processing your signup; please try again later Facebook Twitter Youtube Suggest a correction Sara C Senior Editor, The Huffington Post UK
Friday, March 16 2018
39 Indians Missing In Iraq Since 2014 Are All Dead, Declares Sushma Swaraj Faced With Delhi's Pollution, Modi's Government Bought Air Purifiers Michelle Obama’s Portrait Is So Popular It Had To Be Moved Sudan, The World’s Last Male Northern White Rhino, Dies Aged 45 Why The Rohingya Can't Return 39 Indians Missing In Iraq Since 2014 Are All Dead, Declares Sushma Swaraj Faced With Delhi's Pollution, Modi's Government Bought Air Purifiers Michelle Obama’s Portrait Is So Popular It Had To Be Moved Sudan, The World’s Last Male Northern White Rhino, Dies Aged 45 Business Why The Rohingya Can't Return Entertainment Bollywood Comedy Viral Video Reviews J. K. Rowling Has Magical Message For 'Harry Potter' Fan With Depression Lifestyle ENTERTAINMENT 15/03/2018 9:41 PM IST | Updated 15/03/2018 11:22 PM IST Rihanna Slams Snapchat Advert For ‘Intentionally Bringing Shame To Domestic Violence Victims’ By Rachel McGrath Rihanna has slammed Snapchat , for publishing an advert that asked users: “Would you rather... slap Rihanna or punch Chris Brown?” When Snapchat users spotted the advert - which was created by a third party publisher - earlier this week, the company soon removed it , issuing an apology and stating it “was r eviewed and approved in error”. At the time, Rihanna herself did not respond to the controversy. Mario Anzuoni / Reuters Rihanna On Thursday (15 March) afternoon, though, the singer broke her silence on the matter, using Instagram Stories to make her feelings on Snapchat’s actions - and apology - crystal clear. “Now SNAPCHAT, I know you already know you ain’t my fav app out there! But I’m just trying to figure out what the point was with this mess!” she wrote. “I’d love to call it ignorance, but I know you ain’t that dumb! “You spent money to animate something that would intentionally being shame to DV victims and made a joke of it!!! “This isn’t about my personal feelings, cause I don’t have much of them… but all the women, children and men that have been victims of DV in the past and especially the ones who haven’t made it out yet… you let us down! “Shame on you. Throw the whole app-oligy away.” Rihanna responding to Snapchat's ad. I can't believe they did this. pic.twitter.com/TpHQIXTm4j — Gennette Cordova (@GNCordova) March 15, 2018 In response to Rihanna’s post, a Snapchat spokesperson told HuffPost UK: “This advertisement is disgusting and never should have appeared on our service. “We are so sorry we made the terrible mistake of allowing it through our review process. “We are investigating how that happened so that we can make sure it never happens again.” The creators of the advert, ‘Would You Rather’, has also been blocked from their advertising platform. It wasn’t just Rihanna fans who were unimpressed with the advert, which appeared to reference Chris Brown’s 2009 conviction for assaulting then-girlfriend Rihanna. Chelsea Clinton was among those calling for its removal: Just awful. Awful that anyone thinks this is funny. Awful that anyone thinks this is appropriate. Awful that any company would approve this. Thank you Brittany for calling this out. — Chelsea Clinton (@ChelseaClinton) March 12, 2018 US activist Brittany Packnett also tweeted, writing: “I know that social media ads go through an approval process from the platform. “This means @Snapchat approved an ad that makes light of domestic violence. “The update ain’t the only thing that’s wack over there, friends.” I know that social media ads go through an approval process from the platform. This means @Snapchat approved an ad that makes light of domestic violence. The update ain’t the only thing that’s wack over there, friends. https://t.co/PmbJn4zCel — Brittany Packnett (@MsPackyetti) March 12, 2018 The controversy comes as Snapchat is currently dealing with the fallout from a huge drop in its value, that was sparked by a single tweet , when Kylie Jenner wrote: “Sooo does anyone else not open Snapchat anymore? Or is it just me... ugh this is so sad”. Less than 24 hours later, the stock price of Snap, Snapchat’s parent company, had fallen about 6 percent, closing at $17.51. That represented a $1.3 billion loss in value, according to CNN Money. Suggest a correction Rachel McGrath
Thursday, March 22 2018
Copy And Paste To Republish This Story Reporter’s Notebook: The Tale Of Theranos And The Mysterious Fire Alarm By Jenny Gold March 21, 2018
Reporter’s Notebook: The Tale Of Theranos And The Mysterious Fire Alarm
It was November 2014, and I was working on a feature story about a buzzed-about blood-testing company in Silicon Valley that promised to “disrupt” the lab industry with new technology. The company, Theranos, claimed its revolutionary finger-prick test would be a cheap and less painful way to screen for hundreds of diseases with just a few drops of blood. Old-fashioned venous blood draws, where the patient watches as vial after vial of blood is collected, would quickly become obsolete, Theranos promised.
The interviews took a month to arrange. The public relations officer wanted to know, did I “plan on sourcing other people?” and implied that CEO Elizabeth Holmes might not be available to me if I did talk to other sources. I rejected that condition, but finally the company’s public relations contacts agreed to let me visit its site at the Walgreens in Palo Alto, Calif. — one of the first such setups in the country — followed by a sit-down interview with Holmes at her office.
I arrived at the Walgreens on the morning of Nov. 4 and was met by two Theranos press representatives who would supervise my visit. I took out my recording equipment (the story was for NPR) and began approaching patients who were waiting in line to check in for testing. Some didn’t want to talk to a reporter, but others were open and gracious, sharing with me the reasons they had decided to give Theranos a try. One couple offered to let me come with them into the small testing room, set up to feel like a relaxing spa.
A pattern quickly emerged — none of the patients I talked to that day could get a finger-prick test, as promised. Instead, they received a regular venous blood draw, the same as I’d received on numerous occasions at my doctor’s office, though the phlebotomist said the needle was slightly smaller.
I asked the phlebotomist: Was this standard? Did most patients get the venous draw? She told me they “did more finger sticks than venous draws,” but couldn’t give me a number. One of the PR people approached me — I was not authorized to talk to the phlebotomist, he said — and asked me to erase the audio I had recorded. I declined.
I asked him: Why were none of the patients getting a finger prick? Just bad luck and timing, he said. This wasn’t how it usually was, he promised. And wouldn’t I just rather get a finger prick myself and report on the experience, as so many other journalists had agreed to do?
I said no. I needed an actual patient to make a compelling radio story. So, I continued waiting for other patients.
Soon, the two Theranos representatives approached me again — with a third on the phone, who said she wanted to talk to me. They were getting complaints about my asking patients questions, she told me. The main Theranos office had gotten several calls from people who had been in the Walgreens that morning, she claimed, complaining that a reporter was bothering them.
I hadn’t pressured anyone. The patients I’d interviewed had all been perfectly friendly and willing. I’ve also been a health reporter for 10 years, and never have I been told I was pushing patients to do something that made them uncomfortable.
Something seemed very wrong.
Soon, one of the Theranos representatives approached me again, clearly nervous. They appeared worried. Unless I found a patient getting a finger prick, he said, they would likely have to cancel my interview with Holmes.
It was clearly a threat to try to steer me away from where the story was taking me: Theranos seemed to be doing very few, if any, of its revolutionary tests on actual patients. I asked the press representatives to get the other one on the phone again; I didn’t like being threatened and I wanted to hash it out with her.
Meanwhile, I sat down with another couple, who had driven 45 minutes to experience the vaunted finger prick. Would they too be steered to a traditional blood test?
As I was interviewing them — but before we knew which test they could get — a sudden and jolting BEEP BEEP BEEP reverberated through the drugstore. “Fire alarm!” someone called out, and we evacuated to the street.
I’d never been in a drugstore when the fire alarm went off. There was no smoke and no fire.
I decided to cancel the feature. I had pitched it as a consumer-focused story about how often “less is more” in health care. I clearly no longer had that story. I made a few more calls to various experts on lab testing to try to figure out what was happening: Was Theranos for real? I was given an interview with a lawyer at Theranos, who promised me that “significantly more than 50 percent of the tests are done with a finger prick,” though she would say no more.
Now that Theranos has been implicated in massive fraud, that encounter serves as a reminder of the skepticism both journalists and health care consumers need to have in an age when public relations, marketing and advertising try to guide the story and our treatment.
Theranos generated huge hype and laudatory coverage in places like The New Yorker, Wired and Fortune by selling a compelling idea — even as its PR people couldn’t show me an actual patient who had benefited. Sometimes, in health care, an idea that seems too good to be true, isn’t. We all — patients and journalists — have to do our due diligence.
The PR tactics Theranos employed blocked journalists from providing the kind of scrutiny that might have revealed the fantasy the company was weaving for investors sooner.
And 11 months after my experience at that Walgreens, John Carreyrou of The Wall Street Journal published the first of his groundbreaking investigations surrounding Theranos, blowing the lid off of the company’s fraudulent claims. Of the 240 types of blood tests the company said it did, only 15 used finger-pricking.
Now comes the news that Theranos has accepted a settlement in the fraud case with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Which has me thinking.
Had someone pulled the fire alarm? I’ve been suspicious since the moment it happened.
Last week, I wrote to Theranos to ask. No surprise: no response.
Monday, April 2 2018
325, SARAT CHATTERJEE ROAD, HOWRAH-711 102 No.2065-I(P2) 31st March, 2018 NOTIFICATION In order to celebrate May Day, which falls on 1st May, 2018 (Tuesday), in a befitting manner, the Governor is pleased to declare State Government holiday on 2nd May, 2018 (Wednesday), in addition to 1st May, 2018 which has already been notified as a public holiday vide Notification No.6005-E(P2)/FA/O/lH-04/2012 dated 22.9.2017. All State Government offices including educational institutions, Rural and Urban Local Bodies, Authorities, Boards, Corporations, State Government Undertakings and other parastatals under the State Government, shall remain closed on 2nd May, 2018 (Wednesday) in addition to 1st May, 2018. By order of the Governor, Sd/-Rajsekhar Bandyopadhyay
Sunday, April 15 2018
By Daniel Rasmussen A merica is in the grips of a speculative frenzy. Investment bankers, private investment firms, and even a few dozen recently graduated MBAs labelling themselves “searchers” are calling, emailing, wining, and dining small business owners. Their goal is to translate prosaic small businesses into the poetry of private equity. The great postcrisis private equity gold rush is on, fueled by cheap debt and enthusiastic investors. A lawn care chain might get half a dozen calls and emails a week from business brokers and “searchers.” A regional bank auctioning off a business with $15 million in profits might pitch two hundred prospects, receive fifty letters of intent, and take twelve separate private equity firms to management meetings, ending in a sale price which the majority of bidders considers crazy. And the greatest prize of all—a software company—could sell for many multiples of revenue, regardless of profitability. As with the mortgage-backed securities bubble, experts are the promoters and pioneers of an “asset class” that they claim will offer high returns with low risk, guided by the sage wisdom of elite managers. The legendary leader of Yale University’s endowment, David Swensen, has gone so far as to call private equity a “superior form of capitalism.” The experts agree with Swensen. A recent survey of institutional investors found that 49 percent expect private equity (PE) to outperform the public equity market by a whopping 4 percent per year or more. Another 45 percent believe PE will outperform by 2–4 percent per year. Only 6 percent think returns will be comparable. The survey did not even bother to ask if investors thought PE might underperform. This is particularly shocking given that data from Cambridge Associates shows that private equity returns have lagged the Russell 2000 index by 1 percent and the S&P 500 by 1.5 percent per year over the past five years. This consensus has led institutional investors to flood private markets with capital, about $200 billion per year of new commitments. The result is soaring prices for private companies of all shapes and sizes. Just before the financial crisis, in 2007, the average purchase price for a PE deal was 8.9x ebitda (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization—a commonly used measure of cash profitability). Deal prices reached 8.9x again in 2013 and are now up to nearly 11x ebitda . But asset prices are going up everywhere. What makes private equity dangerous is the use of debt—and the use of phony accounting to conceal the riskiness of these leveraged bets. The average PE deal is 65 percent debt financed, and whereas the valuations of public equities are determined by transparent, liquid public markets, PE firms determine the valuations of their own portfolio companies. Unsurprisingly, they report far lower volatility than public markets. This appraisal accounting also encourages lenders to take risks. After the financial crisis, the Federal Reserve warned banks that most companies could not bear debt above 6x ebitda . Lenders now tend to stop at 6x ebitda in keeping with that rule, but they allow PE firms to play with the definition of ebitda . Whereas regulators require public companies to use GAAP financials, lenders allow PE firms to remove various “one-time” costs to get to “pro forma” ebitda or to take a particularly positive recent quarter and extrapolate from that short time period to an optimistic “run-rate” calculation. Such optimistic metrics are at their most extreme in software, where lenders will finance companies based on neologisms like “annual recurring revenue” and “cash ebitda ,” which, having no fixed definition, allow debt levels to be picked from the air. In 2007, private equity debt levels reached 5.2x ebitda . Today, they are at 5.8x ebitda , and they have been above 5.2x every year since 2013. The 2007 vintage deals did not end well for investors. Today’s higher-priced and more leveraged deals could end even worse. These levels of leverage leave companies with no margin of safety. Most companies’ cash flows are too volatile and unpredictable to sustain high debt levels for long. In addition, the recent tax reform caps interest deductibility at 30 percent of ebitda , which for most firms translates to about 5x ebitda of debt. This will be particularly problematic for highly leveraged firms, especially in any downturn when ebitda declines. Those that are lucky enough to grow will be fine, but companies with large interest payments and looming debt maturities cannot invest for growth. The history of financial markets echoes with a warning: beware markets where investors are not only bullish but also borrowers. Yet there is always a logic behind each bubble, a set of ideas that form the foundation of the consensus thinking. And there are three premises that underlie the private equity boom. First, the experts believe that PE firms make money by improving the companies they buy. Second, the experts believe that PE is less volatile and less risky than public equity. Third, the experts believe that PE will significantly outperform every other investment. There is near complete consensus on these three points among academics, investors, and PE firms. Private equity assets today exceed $2 trillion, and PE firms have $700 billion of dry powder capital just sitting there, waiting to be invested. The market is so flooded with investors and valuations are so high that even the truest believers have not found a way to invest it. There is a huge amount of money betting that this consensus is right, and the voices arguing that the consensus is wrong are marginal relative to the chorus of those who agree. But what does the data show? Is there evidence supporting these three core hypotheses? Or could some of the world’s best and brightest all be betting on the same hollow assumptions? Let’s investigate each of these hypotheses in turn. Do Private Equity Firms Improve Companies’ Operations? At the peak of the private equity boom in early 2007, Cerberus Capital Management announced that it was buying Chrysler from DaimlerChrysler for $7.4 billion. The New York Times described Cerberus as a “private equity firm that specializes in restructuring troubled companies.” “As a private company, Chrysler will be better positioned to focus on its long-term plan for recovery, rather than just short-term results,” Chrysler’s chief executive, Thomas W. LaSorda, told the Times . Conventional wisdom had it that the sharp businessmen at Cerberus could slash costs and return Chrysler to growth. After taking the company private, they could then take the difficult steps necessary to transform it. A mere two years later, however, the company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The turnaround had failed. The financial crisis had sent the company into a tailspin, and Cerberus was derided for its very public failure. Many critics of PE tell stories like this to demonstrate the rapaciousness of PE capitalism—the hubris before the fall, the stripping of assets, the inevitable bankruptcy. But what is more interesting is what it reveals about the narrative of operational improvement. The Chrysler deal is one obvious case study that points to the fact that private equity’s operational savvy is not always as impressive as claimed in marketing materials. PE firms relentlessly promote the idea that they can restructure companies and orient them toward long-term growth rather than short-term results. Blackstone, the PE giant, advertises on its website that it makes money “by investing in great businesses where our capital, strategic insight, global relationships, and operational support can drive transformation and realize the company’s potential. The resulting improvements in growth and global competitiveness benefit not only investors, but also workers, communities, and all stakeholders.” And at some level, this makes sense. Why would Blackstone buy the entire company instead of just a minority stake? Presumably because they think they can run the business better than the current management team. But do PE firms truly improve growth and competitiveness? What impact do these firms really have on the businesses in which they invest? This might seem like an unanswerable question. After all, PE firms take their companies private, hiding their financials from the public. The industry would have us believe that the proof is in the pudding: their return outperformance proves they are better managers who drive superior growth and produce superior outcomes. But there is, actually, a way to answer this question. As it turns out, many PE firms issue debt to finance acquisitions and, in those cases, the firms are required to provide investors with the company’s financials. These financials can be used to compare a company’s pre- and post-acquisition performance to determine exactly what the PE firms achieve. My firm, Verdad, took that information and compiled a comprehensive database of 390 deals, accounting for over $700 billion in enterprise value (EV), a substantial set of data representing the majority of the largest deals ever done. We then analyzed it to understand what has actually been going on in the PE industry. We wanted to put each of the industry’s core claims to the test. Firms like Blackstone often claim that their portfolio companies will achieve accelerated growth and more efficient operations, because of a superior capital structure and PE managers’ ability to make long-term investment decisions that public companies may not be able to make. If these claims are true, we should see results in the financials of the portfolio companies, such as accelerated revenue growth, expanded profit margins, and increased capital expenditures. But the reality is that we see none of these things. What we do see is a sharp increase in debt. In 54 percent of the transactions we examined, revenue growth slowed. In 45 percent, margins contracted. And in 55 percent, capex spending as a percentage of sales declined. Most private equity firms are cutting long-term investments, not increasing them, resulting in slower growth, not faster growth. If PE firms are not growing businesses faster, investing more in growth, or gaining much operational efficiency, just what are they doing? In 70 percent of cases, PE firms are leveraging up the businesses they buy. PE firms typically double the amount of debt on the balance sheet, from 2.5x ebitda to 5x ebitda —the biggest financial change apparent from our study. The industry mythology of savvy and efficient managers streamlining operations and directing strategy to increase growth just isn’t supported by data. Instead, there is a new paradigm for understanding the PE model—and it is very, very simple. As an industry, PE firms take control of businesses to increase debt and redirect spending from capital expenditures and other forms of investment toward paying down that debt. As a result, or in tandem, the growth of the business slows. That is a simple, structural change, not a grand shift in strategy or a change that really requires any expertise in management. That is not to say that debt is always bad, or that rerouting capital to debt paydown is necessarily a negative thing. There is an optimal capital structure for every company that maximizes the value of the interest tax shield while minimizing the risks of financial distress. Many companies have too little leverage. The effective use of leverage was key to private equity’s historical success. In the 1980s and early 1990s, private equity firms helped rein in the impulses of would-be empire builders and bad capital allocators (Japan today could probably use a healthy dose of this, for example). Investors were right to demand earnings not be kept in the business but instead returned to investors through debt paydown and dividends. But there is a big difference—bigger than most realize—between what private equity used to do (buy companies at 6–8x ebitda with a reasonable 3–4x ebitda of debt) and what private equity does today (buy companies at 10–11x ebitda with a dangerous 6–7x unadjusted ebitda of debt). Debt is a double-edged sword. It can provide great benefits if used judiciously, but if regularly applied in large dollops, it can create massive problems. The PE industry has created an effective and pervasive marketing myth: that they are superior to individual companies’ management, operating more efficiently and earning greater returns. But, as we have seen, this is largely fiction. The real reason PE firms want control of the companies they buy is not because of superior strategic insight but because they want to significantly increase debt levels. And while debt magnifies positive returns and enhances the returns of good decision-making, it can also cut the other way, exacerbating negative returns and punishing bad decisions. My firm’s study is not the only one to come to this conclusion. A 2013 study of 317 LBOs by researchers at the University of Texas found “little evidence of operating improvements subsequent to an LBO. . . . Our results suggest that effecting a sustained change in capital structure is a conscious objective of the LBO structure.” Bain & Company’s 2017 global private equity report came to similar conclusions. They compared deal model forecasts for revenue and ebitda with the results for PE deals in their proprietary database. More than two-thirds of the time, PE deals underperformed the ebitda forecasts made at the time of purchase. This underperformance was masked, however, by almost two turns of multiple expansion at sale. “GPs [private equity fund managers] had the good fortune to make up the shortfall in margin expansion through unforeseen multiple expansion,” Bain wrote. The evidence suggests that operational improvements are more marketing than reality. Does Private Equity Offer Lower Risk? Risk and return are generally related, and financial products that offer high returns at a low risk are likely to deliver on neither promise. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky found that humans are twice as sensitive to losses as they are to gains. They call this cognitive bias “loss aversion.” The public equity markets are very volatile—a difficult thing for the loss averse to stomach. The volatility of public markets has consistently puzzled academics since the 1930s. John Burr Williams, who invented modern finance theory, wished for a day when experts would set security prices. He believed that expert valuations would result in “fairer, steadier prices for the investing public.” The PE industry would seem to have made Williams’s dreams come true. Experts, rather than markets, determine the prices of PE-owned companies. Even better, those experts are the PE firms’ employees! Predictably, this results in dramatically lower volatility. The hurly burly of the public markets is replaced by the considered judgment of an accounting firm that just so happens to be employed by the PE fund. Investors have seen how those types of cozy relationships worked out in the past. To understand the magnitude of this difference, consider what happened in 2014 and 2015 when energy prices crashed over 50 percent. The S&P 600 Energy Index dropped 52 percent during the period from December 31, 2012, to September 30, 2015. Yet at September 30, 2015, PE energy funds from the 2011 vintage were actually marked up on average to 1.1x multiple of money invested (MoM), while funds from the 2012 vintage were marked at 1.0x MoM and 2013 vintage funds were marked at 0.8x MoM. PE energy funds almost universally claimed to have dramatically outperformed the public equity market, not even recognizing half of the losses exhibited in public markets. Institutional investors value these “smoothing effects,” as they call them. In a recorded public presentation, the CIO of the Public Employee Retirement System of Idaho called this the “phony happiness” of private equity. “We did know that our actuaries and accountants would accept the smoothing that the accounting would do. It may be phony happiness, but we just want to think we are happy,” he said. “If [private equity] just gave public market returns, we’d be in favor of it because it has some smoothing effects on both reported and actual risks.” In other words, the Public Employee Retirement System of Idaho is allocating more capital to the asset class not in order to make the public employees of Idaho more money but because the CIO of the system values the “phony happiness” of the smoothed accounting. George Washington University professor Kyle Welch argues in a recent paper on PE accounting, “Private Equity’s Diversification Illusion,” that portfolio managers “have incentives to obfuscate systematic risk and to choose investments that appear low-risk.” If public markets take a dive, portfolio managers with large PE holdings might not have to book large losses. Welch shows that if PE firms adopted fair value accounting standards, then the reported volatility of private equity would double. We can also see this in the PE secondary market, where investors trade their stakes in different PE funds. Marking the reported returns of private equity to market by using these secondary transactions would bring the volatility of private equity higher than the public markets. Market pricing demonstrates that private equity is far riskier than internal valuation marks suggest. For example, PE funds traded at 59 percent of their net asset value (NAV) at the depths of the financial crisis when bought by PE secondary firms; the internal marks, in other words, were far from the actual transaction values. But is this smoothing so bad if everything comes out right in the end? That is what some PE investors argue. And to the extent that things do come out right in the end, reducing a few wiggles along the way really is not so problematic. But not seeing the wiggles can also encourage complacency, allowing valuations and leverage levels to climb and climb because the consequences of those decisions have not yet been felt. A lack of short-term accountability just means a delayed reckoning, with all the chips coming due down the road. And there are warning signs that all might not end up so well. Does Private Equity Offer the Best Returns? Over a long horizon, private equity has certainly had a good run. From 1990 to 2010, private equity returned 14.4 percent per year, compared to 8.1 percent per year for the S&P 500 index. This 6.3 percent outperformance was net of private equity’s “2 and 20” fee structure, meaning that the gross return of private equity over this period was more like 20 percent per year. But past performance is a far worse predictor of future returns than prices. And as money has flooded into private equity, the prices paid for PE assets have gone up and up. In 2007, the average purchase price for a PE deal was 8.9x ebitda . Deal prices reached 8.9x again in 2013 and are now nearing 11x ebitda . In fact, private market valuations have been equal to or greater than public market valuations since 2010. As noted earlier, since 2010, private equity has, on average, underperformed the public equity market. Cambridge Associates’ U.S. private equity index has lagged the Russell 2000 by 1 percent and the S&P 500 by 1.5 percent per year over the past five years. Institutional investors’ expectations for PE returns seem rooted in the asset class’s performance in the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s. They have not adjusted for the recent period’s underperformance—an underperformance caused by their invested capital driving up purchase prices. The underperformance since 2010 shows that private equity does not always outperform public equity markets. The relative performance of private equity is contingent on size, leverage, and valuation. The Canadian Pension Plan Investment Board (CPPIB) and the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) did a bottom-up analysis of 3,492 private equity transactions from 1993 to 2014 to understand these dynamics. They found that private equity deals are different on two key quantitative dimensions from public equity investments. First, PE firms buy companies that are significantly smaller than broader public benchmarks. The median market capitalization of a company in the S&P 500 is $41 billion. The median market capitalization of a small-cap company in the Russell 2000 is $2 billion. But the median enterprise value of PE deals is only $250 million. Only about fifteen private equity investments have ever been larger than the maximum market capitalization of the small-cap index. Second, PE deals are significantly more levered than the typical public equity. The CPPIB and ADIA found that the average ratio of net debt to enterprise value at inception has been approximately 65 percent. The typical Russell 2000 small-cap company is levered at about 16 percent while the median large-cap company in the S&P 500 is levered at about 18 percent. These two factors have been basically constant since the early 1980s. Changes in deal size and deal leverage levels do not explain why performance relative to public equity markets dropped off after 2010. And differences in size and leverage explain only about 50 percent of private equity’s historical outperformance of public equity markets. The factor that has changed is valuation. Private equity firms have historically bought companies at much lower valuations than the broader public markets. Here we see a significant shift from before the financial crisis to after. Since the crisis, the flood of money into private equity has driven up purchase prices significantly, eliminating the formerly large gap between private and public market valuations. This is more troubling than most market observers understand. Private equity is price sensitive because of the use of debt. Higher prices require more debt, leading to higher interest costs and higher risk of bankruptcy. The importance of valuation to returns is controversial but key to understanding the asset class, so it is worth looking at the issue from a few different angles. The first approach is to look at PE deals and compare returns to purchase price. One PE firm did just such an analysis and found that over 50 percent of deals done at valuations of more than 10x ebitda lost money and that the aggregate multiple of money was barely over 1.0x (i.e., for every dollar invested, only slightly more than one dollar was returned to investors). The second is to compare the average purchase multiple in a given year to the returns of the funds from that vintage year. There is a –69 percent correlation between purchase price and vintage year return, a strong inverse relationship. The third is to look at PE-backed companies that IPO. My firm, Verdad, looked at every company taken public in the United States and Canada by a top-100 PE firm since the financial crisis, a data set of 195 IPOs with an aggregate ebitda of $66 billion and an aggregate market capitalization of $728 billion. The average company in this data set went public with $4 billion in market capitalization, traded for 17x ebitda , and was 21 percent leveraged on a net debt/enterprise value basis at IPO. We segmented these IPOs by valuation at IPO. We divided the universe into three buckets: companies that went public at less than 10x ebitda (about 20 percent of companies), 10–15x ebitda (about 20 percent of companies), and more than 15x ebitda (about 60 percent of companies). According to our research, the cheaper IPOs dramatically outperformed the Russell 2000, the moderately priced IPOs matched the Russell 2000’s return, and the expensive IPOs underperformed. The fourth approach is to listen to what PE firms are saying themselves. PE executives surveyed by Preqin said their biggest challenge was valuations (their second biggest challenge, worrisomely, was the “exit environment”). Joe Baratta, Blackstone’s global head of private equity, said “this is the most difficult period we’ve ever experienced. . . . You have historically high multiples of cash flows, low yields. I’ve never seen it in my career. It’s the most treacherous moment.” Despite considering it a difficult period to invest, Blackstone Capital Partners VII raised $18 billion in 2015, the largest fund it had ever raised. Whether you look at PE deals or public equity investments, paying high prices for companies and using debt to fund the purchase looks like a bad strategy. The scary thing is that private equity purchase multiples passed 10x in 2015 and show no signs of going down. In our view, the 2015, 2016, and 2017 vintage years are likely to return close to zero percent per year if history is a good guide. Broader Implications Private equity does not always outperform the public equity markets. The major change that PE firms make to portfolio companies is the addition of debt, not magical operational transformation. And the valuation marks which suggest that the volatility of private equity is lower than that of public equity are based on the subjective opinions of the PE firms themselves—hardly an unbiased source. Yet the consensus thinking among institutional investors is leading them to shift money from public equity markets (which they consider overpriced and overly volatile) into private equity markets. But does this shift of capital from public to private make sense? David Swensen, Yale’s chief investment officer, believes it does. He contrasts the “short-termism” of public equity markets with the “five- to seven-year time horizon” of private equity. In his thinking, when you have PE firms acting as “hands-on operators that are going to improve the quality of the companies, there’s no pressure for quarter-to-quarter performance.” This is a traditional criticism of big public companies: they have no real “owner” who looks after the long-term health of the firm or holds managers accountable. Instead, the CEOs respond to the whims and vagaries of a shareholder base that is either dispersed and inattentive or overly focused on short-term movements in the stock price. PE firms, by contrast, are supposed to “think like owners,” making the tough choices that are best for the company in the long run. But the evidence shows that PE firms are really just adding debt: the supposed improvement in incentives and managerial alignment is more marketing than substance. To be sure, debt can have a disciplining effect, and can enhance returns on good investments. But the amount of debt being used in most buyout transactions today has gone way too far. And debt, as Clay Christensen has pointed out, reduces a company’s long-term capital flexibility. The “discipline of debt” and “long-term thinking” are mutually exclusive goals. And it is of course ironic that the same PE firms making these arguments—Blackstone, KKR, Apollo—have themselves gone public. When institutional investors criticize the “short-termism” of public equity markets, perhaps they are really critiquing the transparency of market valuations. The internet and big data have made the inability of most investors to beat the public equity index much more obvious, leading to the rise of passive, low-cost index investing. Perhaps it is no surprise then that highly paid investment managers prefer to move money into private markets, where the numbers are fuzzier and where it takes years rather than minutes for the consequences of bad decisions to be realized. So PE firms end up adding debt in hopes of enhancing returns and using phony accounting to conceal volatility. And the institutional investors that have flooded private equity with capital prefer this “phony happiness” because it reduces career risk and the hard work of having to explain the volatility of public markets to stakeholders. Gold Rushes Past and Present The California gold rush of 1849 was led by individual speculators who dreamed of newfound wealth. The great private equity gold rush of the postcrisis era, like the subprime bubble before it, is led by managers and consultants, whose spreadsheets are well formatted and precisely wrong. The California gold rush of 1849 was based on the discovery of actual gold in streams and mountains. The great private equity gold rush of the postcrisis era is based on airy ideas about operational improvements, low volatility, and historical outperformance. They may not be tangible, but they make for good bullets in a PowerPoint presentation. The California gold rush of 1849 did not end well for the poor and desperate speculators who dreamed of a better future. And the great private equity gold rush of the postcrisis era may not end well for the confident experts who deploy other people’s capital with the goal of staying rich, not getting rich—and it may be even worse for everyone else. How much has private equity contributed to the bizarre economic situation of recent years—in which asset prices soar while underlying GDP, along with productivity growth, remains historically weak? And is today’s private equity froth a warning sign of the next crisis? This article originally appeared in American Affairs Volume II, Number 1 (Spring 2018): 3–16. About the Author Daniel Rasmussen is the founder and portfolio manager of Verdad Advisers. Before founding Verdad, Dan worked at Bain Capital and Bridgewater Associates. Dan graduated from Harvard College summa cum laude and received an MBA from the Stanford Graduate School of Business. He is the New York Times bestselling author of American Uprising: The Untold Story of America’s Largest Slave Revolt (Harper, 2011). Also by Daniel Rasmussen
Wednesday, April 11 2018
Looking for news you can trust?Subscribe to our free newsletters. Researchers at Dartmouth College have found that a computer program widely used by courts to predict an offenders’ risk of reoffending is no more fair or accurate than a bunch of random non-experts who were given the same data and asked to make predictions. The program, Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions, is used in several states to inform pretrial, parole, and sentencing decisions. And while it may sound sophisticated—COMPAS has 137 variables and a proprietary algorithm—the software performs no better than a simple linear predictor using just two variables. “Claims that secretive and seemingly sophisticated data tools are more accurate and fair than humans are simply not supported by our research findings,” said co-author Julia Dressel, an undergraduate who performed the research with Dartmouth computer scientist Hany Farid. Human participants accurately predicted recidivism in 67 percent of the cases; COMPAS was accurate in just over 65 percent. For their peer-reviewed study , published Wednesday in Science Advances ( Science magazine’s open-access “offspring” ), Dressel and Farid commissioned human participants through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk program. In the first round, people were given a short description of a defendant that included seven features, excluding race. With that information, they were tasked with predicting whether a person would reoffend within two years of their most recent crime. Those results were compared with COMPAS’s assessments of the same set of 1,000 defendants. The researchers found no significant difference: The human participants accurately predicted recidivism in 67 percent of cases; COMPAS was accurate in just over 65 percent. “It is troubling that untrained internet workers can perform as well as a computer program used to make life-altering decisions about criminal defendants,” Farid said in a statement. “The use of such software may be doing nothing to help people who could be denied a second chance by black-box algorithms.” The new study comes on the heels of a 2016 investigation by ProPublica, whose reporters found that COMPAS was not only remarkably unreliable—just 61 percent of the people predicted to reoffend did so—it also showed racial disparities. COMPAS incorrectly flagged black defendants for recidivism nearly twice as often as it incorrectly flagged white ones. Participants in the Dartmouth study also turned up false positives for black defendants more frequently, even when they weren’t shown the person’s race. They did so in 37 percent of cases, compared with a bit over 40 percent for COMPAS. For white defendants, participants turned up false positives in about 27 percent of cases, versus COMPAS’s 25 percent. The researchers recruited a second set of participants to repeat their study, only this time race was included as a factor. The overall accuracy rate was nearly identical to that of the first round, but the disparity between false positives for black defendants versus white went up: 40 percent versus 26 percent. “The entire use of recidivism prediction instruments in courtrooms should be called into question.” The overall results prompted Dressel and Farid to question the sophistication of COMPAS’s predictive algorithm. For the study’s third portion, they set up their own tool: a simple linear predictor algorithm that used the same seven features as the human participants were given. It yielded similar results. Then the researchers tried building a more powerful program, which, using the same data, again showed nearly identical results. COMPAS wasn’t the only software examined. The researchers reviewed a total of nine different algorithmic approaches to predicting recidivism, and even the best one had “only moderate levels of predictive accuracy,” they wrote. With the tools currently available, the authors note, the data COMPAS uses may not be “separable.” This means it may not be possible for any program—COMPAS or otherwise—to use it to accurately assess recidivism risk. In yet another test, a linear predictor algorithm provided with just two features—the person’s age and number of previous convictions—did as well as COMPAS, which is to say, not great. “The entire use of recidivism prediction instruments in courtrooms should be called into question,” Dressel said. “Along with previous work on the fairness of criminal justice algorithms, these combined results cast significant doubt on the entire effort of predicting recidivism.” “When considering using software such as COMPAS in making decisions that will significantly affect the lives and well-being of criminal defendants, it is valuable to ask whether we would put these decisions in the hands of random people who respond to an online survey,” they wrote. Because “the results from these two approaches appear to be indistinguishable.” Fact: Mother Jones was founded as a nonprofit in 1976 because we knew corporations and the wealthy wouldn’t fund the type of hard-hitting journalism we set out to do. Today, reader support makes up about two-thirds of our budget, allows us to dig deep on stories that matter, and lets us keep our reporting free for everyone. If you value what you get from Mother Jones , please join us with a tax-deductible donation so we can keep on doing the type of journalism that 2018 demands.
Tuesday, April 17 2018
2 per cent of Basic Pay 3. 4 per cent of Basic Pay 4. 1-7-2017 5 per cent of Basic Pay 2. Government of India in its Office Memorandum second read above has enhanced the Dearness Allowance payable to its employees from the existing rate of 5% to 7% with effect from 1st January 2018. Date from which Rate of Dearness Allowance [per month]  1-1-2018 7 per cent of Basic Pay 3. Following the orders issued by the Government of India, the Government sanction the revised rate of Dearness Allowance to the State Government employees as indicated below: 4. The additional installment of Dearness Allowance payable under these orders shall be paid in cash with effect from 1-1-2018. 5. The arrears of Dearness Allowance for the months of January, February and March 2018 shall be drawn and disbursed immediately by existing cashless mode of Electronic Clearance System (ECS). While working out the revised Dearness Allowance, fraction of a rupee shall be rounded off to next higher rupee if such fraction is 50 paise and above and shall be ignored if it is less than 50 paise. 6. The Government also direct that the revised Dearness Allowance sanctioned above shall be admissible to full time employees who are at present getting Dearness Allowance and paid from contingencies at fixed monthly rates. The revised rates of Dearness Allowance sanctioned in this order shall not be admissible to part time employees. 7. The revised Dearness Allowance sanctioned in this order shall also apply to the teaching and non-teaching staff working in aided educational institutions, employees under local bodies, employees governed by the University Grants Commission/All India Council for Technical Education scales of pay, the Teachers/Physical Education Directors/Librarians in Government and Aided Polytechnics and Special Diploma Institutions, Village Assistants in Revenue Department, Noon Meal Organisers, Child Welfare Organisers, Anganwadi Workers, Cooks, Helpers, Panchayat Secretaries/Clerks in Village Panchayat under Rural Development and Panchayat Raj Department and Sanitary Workers drawing special time scale of pay. 8.The expenditure shall be debited to the detailed head of account’03. Dearness Allowance’ under the relevant minor, sub-major and major heads of account. 9. The Treasury Officers / Pay and Accounts Officers shall make payment of the revised Dearness Allowance when bills are presented without waiting for the authorization from the Principal Accountant General (A&E), Tamil Nadu, Chennai-18. (BY ORDER OF THE GOVERNOR) K.SHANMUGAM ADDITIONAL CHIEF SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT
Sunday, April 15 2018
Home » Tamil Nadu » You are reading » 7% DA Orders Jan 2018: Tamilnadu Government Employees and Pensioners 7% DA Orders Jan 2018: TN Govt Employees and Pensioners The Government of Tamil Nadu, Finace Department issued orders to enhanced rate of Dearness Allowance payable to its employees from the existing rate of 5% to 7% with effect from 1st January 2018. The arrears of Dearness Allowance for the months of January, February and March 2018 shall be drawn and disbursed immediately by existing cashless mode of Electronic Clearance System (ECS). Pensioners and Family Pensioners: Dearness Relief enhanced from 5% to 7% applicable with effect from 1.1.2018 to all Pensioners and Family Pensioners. Rate of Dearness Allowance applicable with effect from 1-1-2018 in respect of employees continuing to draw their pay in the Pre-2006 pay scales and Pre-2016 pay scale/Grade Pay. AD-HOC INCREASE – Employees drawing Consolidated Pay / Fixed Pay / Honorarium – Another Ad-hoc Increase from 1 1 2018 – Orders – Issued. http://www.stategovernmentnews.in/7-da-orders-jan-2018-tamilnadu-government-employees-pensioners/ 2018-04-15T09:49:46+00:00 admin Tamil Nadu 7th Pay Commission for Pensioners,State Govt Employees,Tamil Nadu State Govt Employees,TN Govt Employees,TN Govt Pensioners 7% DA Orders Jan 2018: TN Govt Employees and Pensioners The Government of Tamil Nadu, Finace Department issued orders to enhanced rate of Dearness Allowance payable to its employees from the existing rate of 5% to 7% with effect from 1st January 2018. The arrears of Dearness Allowance for the months... admin [email protected] Administrator State Government Employees News